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Summary 
 
We examine the effects of the ‘natural resource curse’ on Chad and find little evidence for Dutch disease. 
Structural vector auto-regression suggests that changes in domestic output and prices are overwhelmingly 
determined by aggregate demand and supply shocks, and while oil production and high international prices 
negatively affect agricultural output, the effects are small. Consistent with empirical evidence for neighbouring 
Cameroon, we observe minimal impact on Chad’s manufacturing sector. We associate our findings with 
structural underemployment and the inefficient use of existing production factors. In this context, increased 
public expenditures in tradable sectors present the opportunity to make oil revenues an engine of national 
development. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Economic history is replete with examples of natural resource-poor countries 
outperforming natural resource-rich countries. Sachs and Warner (1995) find an inverse 
relationship between natural resource intensity and growth between 1970 and 1990, and 
their results are supported by the fact that there are very few cases of resource-abundant 
developing countries sustaining 2% per annum growth during this period. Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) call this phenomenon the Natural Resource Curse. 
 In the economic literature, while several studies explain the negative relationships 
between natural resource exploitation and economic growth, there are four plausible 
explanations that emerge from the previous research (1) Rent-seeking would not encourage 
governments of such countries to invest in innovative sectors with growth potential, Gelb 
(1988) and Auty (1990). (2) The governments of such countries would rather waste rents 
through profligate or inappropriate consumption. (3) Price volatility of natural resources 
leads to greater uncertainty, which can reduce factor accumulation through greater risk. (4) 
More recent studies, from the 1970s and 1980s, suggest that Dutch disease is responsible, 
i.e., natural resource production promotes de-industrialisation, Neary and Van Wijnbergen 
(1986) and Matsuyama (1992). Indeed, booms in natural resource sectors do affect the 
distribution of employment throughout the economy. For example, one typical African 
country that is afflicted by the natural resource curse is Nigeria. Nigeria is one of the top ten 
oil exporters in the world; however, its economy was stagnant and failed to alleviate poverty 
until very recently when reforms were finally undertaken, Budina, Pang, Van Wijnbergen 
(2006). Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003, show that rather than Dutch disease, waste 
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and corruption from oil have been responsible for Nigeria’s poor, long-run economic 
performance. As an illustration, in 1965, when oil revenues per capita were approximately 
US$33, the per capita GDP of Nigeria was US$245. In 2000, when oil revenues were 
US$325 per capita, the per capita GDP remained at the 1965 level, US$245. These statistics 
suggest that the oil revenues, estimated at US$350 billion, did nothing to improve the 
standard of living in Nigeria and, in fact, may have degraded it.  
 
Chad discovered and began exploiting oil in 2003, and ever since, there has been some 
concern about how and if Chad will benefit from this new source of revenue. Indeed, in 2001 
the World Bank agreed to finance the oil exploitation project under the condition that Chad 
use the oil revenues to finance social programmes and develop its infrastructure. However, 
some irregularities were recently found, prompting us to analyse Chad and determine if it is 
a potential natural resource curse country. For the past decade, Chad has been experiencing 
high volatility in commodities prices, especially those of oil, which may translate into 
macroeconomic instability. While it may be considered a tax on investment, highly 
volatile relative prices discourage the irreversible commitments to specific sectors 
that capital investment implies. Furthermore, Chad, which has been an unstable 
country since its independence, is still plagued by tension and conflict between the 
government and the rebels. As a result, its CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment) index ranking is very low, indicating that it is a very poorly governed 
country. Combined with its inadequate government, features of Dutch disease have 
appeared in Chad’s economy.  
Typical symptoms of Dutch disease are a decline of production in tradable sectors 
such as agriculture and manufacturing, an increase in prices in non-tradable sectors, and an 
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appreciation of an effective exchange rate. In countries affected by Dutch disease, the 
positive effects of a natural resource boom are diminished by the negative effects of 
contraction and stagnation in the country’s tradable sectors and by an appreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate. Consistent with these symptoms, Ndjamena, the capital of Chad, 
ranked third with respect to cost of living, just behind Tokyo, in a recent survey.
1
 This 
suggests that people living in Ndjamena pay higher living costs, defined as consumption, in 
non-tradable sectors. This paper examines the features that could result in Chad becoming a 
natural resource curse country, even when the windfall oil revenue it is experiencing could 
be an opportunity to boost the nation’s economic growth, if properly managed. Moreover, if 
Dutch disease is diagnosed, economic measures could be taken to guide Chad in taking 
advantage of oil revenues. For example, Chad’s government could invest part of the 
country’s oil revenue in the agricultural or manufacturing sectors, thus serving to avoid 
further decline in the sector. By doing so, Chad could also avoid being the victim of the 
natural resource curse. The effects of Dutch disease, however, are more challenging to 
evaluate in Chad because of data limitations and also because the non-oil sectors are 
underdeveloped, making it difficult to detect their current and anticipated decline. A good 
diagnosis of Dutch disease would make economic policies more appropriate and help to 
avoid the problems associated with the resource curse. Indeed, if measures are taken to 
counter Dutch disease when the economy does not suffer, it could have disastrous 
consequences. And if measures are not taken when the economy is threatened, the 
consequences could be equally destructive. The policy recommendations must complement 
counter-policies to other channels of the natural resource curse and reinforce them. To the 
                                                   
1
 See http://www.mercer.com/costoflivingpr in detail. The most expensive city in the world is Luanda in 
Angola, according to the same survey. 
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best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address the issue of the natural resource curse 
in Chad, and as such, this paper is interesting in the sense that Chad is one of the latest 
low-income countries to have discovered oil. Therefore, there is concern about the effects of 
this oil windfall on Chad’s economic recovery.  
In this paper, we consider four channels through which a country may become a natural 
resource curse country, and we thoroughly analyse the possibility of Dutch disease through 
its main channels. Because of some specificities to developing countries that are not taken 
into consideration in the original model of Corden and Neary (1982), we deem it relevant to 
verify our intuition through an empirical analysis. Indeed, when some hypotheses (perfect 
substitutability between domestic and imported goods, nonexistence of unemployment and 
efficient use of production factors) are relaxed, some conclusions of the original model do 
not hold, making it difficult, through an analysis of Chad’s economic data, to draw a 
conclusion regarding Dutch disease. Therefore, we use a structural VAR model to assess 
whether the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of Chad are affected by Dutch disease. 
Introducing structural shocks allows us to take into consideration some specific effects of oil 
discovery on Chad’s economy. Indeed, with only a simple Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR), 
we were not able to make any substantive conclusions. Our results suggest, however, that 
there is no evidence of Dutch disease in the manufacturing sector, while evidence of the 
disease is a bit more obvious in the agricultural sector. We remain cautious in the 
interpretation of our results, as the data from the manufacturing and agricultural output must 
be interpolated quarterly due to data limitations.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides analyses of Chad’s economy as 
a potential natural resource curse country. Further analyses regarding Dutch disease and its 
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main transmission channels are presented in section 3. In Section 4, we conduct some 
empirical tests, and in the analysis, we establish the impulse response functions and the 
variance decompositions by estimating a structural vector auto-regression (VAR) model. In 
Section 5, we summarise the findings of this study and propose some policy 
recommendations. 
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2. Stylised facts: Chad and the natural resource curse 
 
Several studies emphasise the fact that natural resource-rich countries perform far worse 
than less well-endowed countries. Frankel, 2010, identifies five channels through which the 
natural resource curse can occur: volatility, institutions, anarchy, the crowding out of 
manufacturing and Dutch disease. Chad discovered and began exploiting oil in 2003. Since 
this date, there has been much concern about how Chad can benefit from this new source of 
revenue. Indeed, in 2001 the World Bank agreed to finance the oil exploitation project under 
the condition that Chad use the oil revenues to finance social programmes and develop 
infrastructure. However, some irregularities were recently detected, leading us to analyse 
Chad as a potential natural resource curse country.  
 
a) Volatility: 
One channel of the natural resource curse is the volatility due to fluctuations in 
commodities’ prices. Commodities’ prices fluctuated widely in recent years with a dramatic 
increase in certain products such as oil, whose price index rose from 47.23 in January 2000 
to 188.44 in October 2011. Its standard deviation of 53.47 over the past decade reflects the 
high volatility of oil prices. This volatility in oil prices is then transmitted to government 
resources and to the commodities’ price level in Chad. Since the discovery of oil, 
government resources have largely been made up of oil revenues. Thus, public spending as a 
share of non-oil GDP has increased by 46% between 2003 and 2009, while inflation was 8 to 
10% between 2008 and 2009, unlike other CEMAC
2
 countries, where it is approximately 
                                                   
2 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa.  
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3.5%. These effects create uncertainty in the investment decisions of the public sector as 
well as private agents, thus ultimately impeding economic growth. 
 
b) Poor institutions: 
The literature indicates that entrepreneurial activity, by creating new and better goods or 
services, destroys rents accruing to those holding licenses, thus restricting trade in already 
existing goods or services. Lane and Tornell, 1996 and 1999, show that, in an economy with 
multiple powerful groups, each group has open access to production and higher productivity 
may, in fact, force a decline in the rate of return on investment and thus on growth. This 
scenario is probable because, when productivity increases, each group attempts to acquire a 
greater share of the production by demanding more transfers, which, at term, increases the 
tax rate and reduces the net return on capital. Thus, the redistribution effect may outweigh 
the direct effect of increased productivity. Similarly, Baland and Francois, 2000, show that 
when a significant number of individuals are already engaged in rent seeking behaviours, an 
increase in productivity drives the economy towards more rent seeking and may actually 
lead to a decline in the aggregate income. Torvik, 2002, finds that if productivity growth 
increases profits in rent situations relative to profits in the production sector, the result is 
lower welfare. Many empirical studies corroborate these facts. Gallagher, 1991, documents 
the disproportionate rise in rents with increases in income throughout the African continent, 
while Hilaire, 1992, describes the decline in Trinidad and Tobago’s GDP immediately after 
oil prices quadrupled, an event that constituted 20% of the country’s GDP in 1972 through 
1974, and further documents a rise in the premium on import licenses for food. Chad could 
be one of these bad examples. Indeed, Chad, ranked 171 out of 178 countries by 
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Transparency International, is one of the most corrupt states in the world, and Chad’s 
institutions remain poor, as indicated by its 2.2/6 CPIA index (Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment) in 2010. Chad demonstrates very low levels in terms of its 
management of the four components of CPIA index: economic management, structural 
policies, policies for social inclusion and public sector management and institutions. 
Regulation remains inadequate, particularly with regard to creating or closing a business. 
Moreover, the proportion of budgetary resources allocated to priority sectors remain below 
the levels suggested by the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper), a fact that particularly 
disadvantages social sectors and rural development. Even though Chad was accepted in 
April 2010 as an EITI
3
 (extractive industries transparency initiative) candidate, progress 
remains slow. Thus, most governance indicators show that much remains to be done at this 
level. 
 
c) Anarchy: 
Statistics show that more and more countries around the world have democratised and 
succeeded in establishing a peaceful environment. This is not true, however, in natural 
resource-rich countries. The annual rate for democratisation since 1980 is 3.17 for natural 
resource non-rich countries and 1.13 for resource-rich countries. Chad is a country that has 
long been affected by political instability. However, recent negotiations between the 
government and the rebels have somewhat quieted these tensions, though the last 
parliamentary and presidential elections were marked by unrest and protest. Furthermore, 
the management of oil revenues reflected a faster increase in government spending than did 
                                                   
3 It aims to promote governance by strengthening transparency in the extractive industries. Revenues from the 
extractive industries should be an important source of economic growth and social development in developing countries. 
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other resources, a situation due, in part, to the fact that Chad did not create a sovereign fund 
to manage the volatility of oil resources and ensure the proper use of the funds.  
 
d) Crowding out of the manufacturing sector: 
This effect is not really observed in Chad, as many investments, the result of oil revenues or 
foreign direct investment, have been made in new factories and industries. These 
investments have helped to provide Chad with new industries such as a refinery, a power 
plant, and a cement factory, which, in turn, have enhanced Chad’s industry sector and freed 
the country from its dependence on foreign refined oil. However, we propose to better 
analyse this crowding-out effect of manufacturing along with the phenomenon of Dutch 
disease.  
 
e) Transmission channels of Dutch disease: a brief overview 
Corden and Neary’s (1982) original model of Dutch disease considers a small country with 
full and efficient employment of production factors in the two tradable and non-tradable 
sectors where there is a mobile production factor transferable between sectors and a 
perfectly elastic demand for tradable goods. (i) Large resource boom inflows entail an 
increase in aggregate expenditures for tradable and non-tradable goods, thus influencing the 
real effective exchange rate (REER). An increased demand for non-tradables, induced by 
financial inflows, translates into an upward shift in the demand for non-tradables (services 
and contraction sectors) as well as an increase in their prices. As the price of tradables is 
fixed, the REER appreciates, which discourages their production. This is the spending 
effect. (ii) In the non-tradable sector, as the marginal product of labour increases as a result, 
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there is a reallocation of labour from the tradables sectors to the non-tradables sectors. This 
is the resource transfer effect. (iii) Last, REER appreciation induces a disincentive to buy 
non-tradables. This is the expenditure–switching effect (the volatility channel).4 Further, 
if the relationships between natural resource exports and government expenditures (or 
government revenues) are correlated, the movement of a real effective exchange rate will be 
volatile through the spending effect. Serven (2003) finds that high volatility tends to have 
negative impacts on investment and economic growth. In sum, the transmission channels 
and the effects of Dutch disease, presented first by Brahmbhatt, Canuto, and Vostroknutova 
(2010)
5
, can be summarised as follows.
6
  
Figure 1: Transmission Channels and Effects of Dutch Disease 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: REER denotes a real effective exchange rate. 
Source: Authors. 
                                                   
4
 We can consider the volatility channel an untraditional channel in the sense that most previous studies mainly 
focus on the spending effect and the resource movement effect. 
5
 Overall explanation of the transmission channels can be found in Brahmbhatt, Canuto, and Vostroknutova 
(2010). Cerutti and Mansilla (2008) and Oomes and Kalcheva (2007) also provide clear explanations of the 
spending effect and the resource movement effect. 
6
 A similar summary can be found in Oomes and Kalcheva (2007). 
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However, there are many features in the model of Corden and Neary (1982) that do not fit the 
characteristics of low income countries (LICs). For instance, most LICs suffer from high 
structural unemployment and inefficient use of existing production factors. As an illustration, 
Chad is far from full employment and has much idle capital
7
. Again, many importables are 
domestically produced in LICs, and if one disaggregates the tradables sectors into 
exportables and importables, the threat of reduction in the tradables sectors is mitigated. 
Nkusu (2004) notes that in LICs, there is imperfect substitutability between domestically 
produced manufactured goods and imported goods. Furthermore, domestic manufacturers 
have the ability to raise prices and increase supply in response to domestic market conditions, 
while manufacturing firms that use sizable amounts of imported inputs can benefit from a 
relatively appreciated domestic currency. Because of the complementarity between imported 
and domestically produced inputs, the demand for domestic inputs can also increase. As a 
result, input supplier firms, as well as firms using domestic and imported inputs, will expand 
according to the price elasticities of the supply of inputs and the demand for goods. In the 
end, elasticity-prices mitigate the REER appreciation, and again, the risk of 
de-industrialisation is mitigated.  
According to the same author (Nkusu), in the two-sector model, the resource effect is a 
corollary of the spending effect because of the assumption of full employment. However, 
when this hypothesis is relaxed, the resource effect cannot, by itself, trigger Dutch disease 
effects. As an illustration, Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner, 1989, using a computable 
general equilibrium model for Cameroon, show that when there is imperfect substitutability 
between domestic and imported goods, some of the manufacturing sector could benefit. 
                                                   
7 IMF country report, No 09/67, 2009. 
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Moreover, whenever resource inflows are used in the socioeconomic sector, the three-sector 
model of Dutch disease (which differentiates between importables and exportables in the 
tradables sector) is more relevant, and Dutch disease effects can be reversed. Indeed, an 
increased use of available resources allows both the tradables and non-tradables sectors to 
expand, in which case, the trade balance would not necessarily deteriorate. These 
cause-effect events are demonstrated in Levy’s (2007) general equilibrium model as she 
simulates the positive effects of agricultural policy (road network for food distribution and 
irrigation infrastructure) on Chad’s economy. The results reveal that using oil revenues to 
improve water access in Chad’s rural areas promotes poverty reduction and, at the same time, 
generates substantial economic growth. A road network not only improves food distribution 
of agricultural products and market integration, but it is also believed to improve trade and 
human and physical capital productivity. Thus, if oil revenues are well spent in the key 
agricultural sectors, the three most common symptoms of Dutch disease (a decline of 
specific sectors, an increase in the real exchange rate, worsening of poverty and inequality) 
may not appear. Based on these contrasting models and simulations, Nkusu (2004) and Levy 
(2007)), and while taking into consideration developing countries’ specificities and the good 
use of oil revenues, we more thoroughly analyse the relationship between Chad and Dutch 
disease, that is, whether Chad is affected by Dutch disease. 
 
3. Chad’s economic statistics and Dutch disease channels 
Our methodology is to analyse stylised facts that could reveal the three effects of Dutch 
disease, though data on Chad’s economy are very scarce. We were, nevertheless, able to find 
data using the BEAC (Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale) and the IMF (International 
14 
 
Monetary Fund) data sources. While Chad’s case reveals some patterns of the spending 
effect, it is difficult given the availability of the data to conclude the extent of resource and 
volatility effects.  
 
 
 Spending effect: 
Although the data do not allow us to observe the share of spending on non-tradables, data 
from the table of financial operations of the Chadian government indicate that government 
spending tripled between 2003 (year in which oil began to be exploited) and 2009 (figure 2). 
This sharp increase is mainly due to current expenditures, which increased by 332%, and 
capital expenditures, which increased by 57%. The increased capital expenses mainly served 
to provide road infrastructure, which placed Chad second behind Cameroon among CEMAC 
countries. Other investments included those in the social field through the construction of 
health and education infrastructure. As for current expenditures, the increase is mainly due 
to the expense of transfers and subsidies (which increased by 1338%), military expenditures 
(which increased by 203%) and other current expenditures consisting primarily of salaries 
and materials (which increased by 174%). As noted, these data show a sharp increase in 
public spending, though the distribution of these expenditures is not necessarily well 
addressed, as evidenced by the data. The increase in military spending (wages and weapons) 
is a response to political instability and recurring conflicts that Chad has faced. Furthermore, 
social spending, which could have been financed by subsidies and transfers, have not yielded 
significant results. Indeed, Chad remains one of the least developed countries in terms of 
social development, with a ranking of 175 out of 182 on the Human Development Index of 
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UNDP (2007). Again, assuming that some of these subsidies and transfers have been 
allocated to key economic sectors, such as oil and cotton, the results remain disappointing 
and disconcerting. The cotton sector presents a significant decline in production from 2003 
to 2009. For example, cotton seeds decreased from 102,000 tons to 40,000 tons, though there 
was a peak in 2004 of 207,500 tons. Regardless, increased government expenditures do not 
result in higher prices for non-tradables
8
. 
 
Figure 2: Expenditures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BEAC. 
Note: The figures in 2009 are estimations, and those in 2010 are the projections. 
 
The two other channels of Dutch disease do not allow us to conclude with certainty whether 
Chad is a victim of this economic pitfall. 
 
                                                   
8 IMF country report No 09/67. 
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 Resource movement effect: 
Increased personal expenditures in the public sector are due to an increase of 47% in the 
average wage and an increase in the number of employees in the public sector from 57,000 in 
2001 to 117,000 in 2008. However, our data do not allow us determine the origin of this 
workforce. Therefore we cannot draw a conclusion about the existence of a resource 
movement effect.  
 
 Exchange rate volatility 
Similarly, the anchor of the CFA franc to the euro does not allow us to observe the volatility 
of the real effective exchange rate. Before the discovery of oil in Chad, Chad’s main trading 
partner for exports had been the euro area (approximately 60 percent in exports). After the 
discovery of oil, however, Chad increased oil exports to the U.S., which then became Chad’s 
main trading partner (approximately 90 percent of Chad’s trading is with the U.S., (figure 3)). 
Consequently, if the dollar depreciates against the euro, Chad’s real effective exchange rate 
will likely appreciate.
9
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
9
 For example, if we consider that the world consisted only pf Chad, the U.S., and the euro area, Chad’s real 
effective exchange rate could be expressed as REER=Wus×Eus×(Pus/PChad)+ Weuro×Eeuro×(Peuro/PChad). Here, Wus 
and Weuro are the weights, that is, the trade flows (both exports and imports) between Chad and the U.S. and 
Chad and the euro area, respectively. Eus and Eeuro are the nominal exchange rates defined as units of domestic 
currency per unit of foreign currency. Pi is the price level in country i measured by the CPI index. By using 
these relationships, we estimated Chad’s real effective exchange rate (REER) in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3: Exports to the U.S. (left) and to the Euro Area (right)  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IFS. 
Note: SD denotes standard deviation and is calculated by authors. U.S./World and Euro/World denote the ratio 
of exports to the U.S. and those to the world, and the ratio of exports to the Euro Area and those to the world, 
respectively. 
 
As an illustration, figure 4 depicts the trend of the CFA franc against the U.S. dollar, 
indicating that the U.S. dollar is depreciating against the CFA franc. By using the nominal 
exchange rate, the CPI index, and the trade flows, we estimate Chad’s real effective 
exchange rate. Figure 5 shows, as expected, that the REER is appreciating, as reflected in 
both the increase of trade flows with the U.S. and the depreciation of the U.S. dollar against 
the euro. 
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  Source: IFS.                                   Source: IFS and WDI. 
                        Note: Authors’ calculation 
Therefore, the real effective exchange rate is not a meaningful indicator of Dutch disease in 
Chad’s case, because its appreciation since 2004 cannot be interpreted with certainty as an 
effect of Dutch disease. A thorough analysis would require a close examination of the micro 
data to calculate Chad’s real effective exchange rate. For example, Drelichman (2005) 
calculates price indices and the real exchange rate of Spain during the 16th and 17th 
centuries by collecting data for traded and non-traded consumption goods. However, the 
data limitations with which we are faced with respect to Chad do not allow us to conduct 
such an analysis.  
As previously explained (second section herein), the volatility effect is the movement of a 
real effective exchange rate due to the volatility of government spending, which, in turn, is 
due to the volatility of the prices of natural resource exports. As depicted in graph 6, 
government expenditures and oil revenues are correlated, though the real effective exchange 
rate appreciated during the same period, as previously illustrated herein. Trade balance is 
positive from 2003 and increases, as do government expenditures, until 2009, the year in 
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which this balance decreases (although it does remain positive). This decline can be 
explained by fewer exports to the U.S. (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 6: Revenue and Expenditure        Figure 7: Government Consumption  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BEAC.                                  Source:WDI. 
Note: The figures for 2009 are estimations and      Note: SD denotes standard deviation and is calculated  
for 2010, they are projections.                           by authors. 
 
Figure 7 shows that the volatility of government consumption, which has been increasing 
since 2004. This increase could suggest a risk with respect to an increase in the volatility for 
the real exchange rate and, therefore, a threat to stable economic growth. Furthermore, upon 
a thorough examination of the composition of exports and imports (figures 8 and 9), we 
notice that oil exports rise sharply and represent the bulk of the exports (85%, on average, 
over the period) at the expense of cotton fibre and other exports, whose export quantities 
have decreased. Meanwhile, imports have almost doubled from 2003 to 2009, an increase 
that is attributable to the non-oil sector, the oil sector and the public sector. 
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Figure 8: Chad FoB exports in billions CFA F   Figure 9: Chad imports in billions 
       CFA F    
    
 
          
      
          
       
 
 
 
 Contraction and stagnation in tradable sectors (de-industrialisation) 
One typical symptom of Dutch disease is contraction and stagnation in the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors (tradable sectors) through the spending effect and the 
resource movement effect. Chad, having discovered oil reserves in 2003, has engaged in oil 
exportation ever since. Prior to the discovery of oil reserves in Chad, Chad’s main exports 
were agricultural products such as cotton and livestock; however, after the discovery of the 
oil reserves, oil quickly became Chad’s dominant export. (Figure 10). Figure 11 shows that 
oil production has declined gradually since 2004. Figure 12, which depicts the share of the 
output in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors as a percent of the GDP indicates that 
the contraction of the agricultural sector is substantial. Therefore, at first glance, Chad seems 
to be clearly affected by Dutch disease, as a decline of production in agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors is one of its typical symptoms.  
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Source: BEAC. 
Note: The figures in 2009 are the estimation.            Source: Geointelligence Network, Project update. 
 
Given that Chad’s GDP has increased because of oil exports, we are a bit sceptical 
in drawing this conclusion. Indeed, figure 13 shows that output in the manufacturing sector 
is increasing, while the output in the agricultural sector declined severely in 2005 and has 
been sluggish even since.
10
 The aforementioned evidences suggest that the agricultural 
sector could be affected by Dutch disease and that the manufacturing sector is not affected. 
This is consistent with the results of some previous studies, such as Benjamin, Devarajan 
and Weiner (1989) and Fardmanesh (1991). For example, Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner 
(1989), conclude that the manufacturing sector in Cameroon could expand output, thus 
assuming imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. 
 
 
                                                   
10
 However, it should be noted that we cannot solely rely on the possibility of Dutch disease for the plunge of 
the output in the agricultural sector. We should also consider other diverse external factors, such as weather, 
civil war, and enabling environment. 
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Figure 12: Share of Output (% of GDP)          Figure 13: Value Added 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WDI.                                   Source: WDI. 
Note: Value added (current LCU). By using CPI 
 index (2005=100), we calculate real term basis. 
 
Given the stylised facts, we question whether Chad’s economy is actually affected by Dutch 
disease.  
 
4. Prospecting for Dutch disease in manufacturing and agricultural sectors 
 
 Methodology 
 
In this section, we conduct certain empirical tests. Recent studies such as the IMF 
(2009), Cerutti and Mansilla (2008) and Oomes and Kalcheva (2007) use an equilibrium real 
exchange rate method for their empirical analyses, as this method estimates the relationships 
between a real effective exchange rate and certain influential variables such as terms of trade, 
productivity differentials, trade openness and government spending. In the analysis of Chad, 
however, we face a few limitations. First, as mentioned in Section 3, it is difficult to rely on 
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the real effective exchange rate for the analysis. Second, Chad has relatively poor data, and 
thus, it is difficult to calculate some of the influential variables mentioned within this text. 
Therefore, we choose a method that requires a poor theoretical framework: a VAR model. 
VAR models are commonly used for forecasting systems of interrelated time series and for 
analysing the dynamic impact of random disturbances on the system of variables. Hutchison 
(1994) uses a vector error correction model (VECM), which is a restricted VAR for non 
stationary, co-integrated series, to assess whether there is Dutch disease in the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Norway. Taking into consideration the energy prices, energy output, 
money/credit supply, and manufacturing output, he concludes that there is no specific sign 
for Dutch disease in the manufacturing sector of these countries. In a more recent paper, 
Bjorland (1998), on the other hand, showed that while Norway presents no evidence of 
Dutch disease, the UK is subject to Dutch disease in the long run. She concludes that in 
Norway, energy booms and oil price increases stimulate the economy, which, in turn, leads 
to increases in manufacturing production. To the contrary, in the UK, energy booms had a 
small negative impact on manufacturing, thus suggesting that other factors (i.e., oil price 
shocks, for example) could explain this decline. She was able to perform a refined analysis 
because of the use of structural VAR. Structural VAR, through the introduction of 
restrictions, yields some intuitive theoretical economic justifications to the VAR model, thus 
allowing it to take into consideration some effects of oil discovery on the economy.      
 
In our case, we conduct two VAR models for the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. The 
first model (model 1) consists of the volume of oil extraction (ovt), the real oil price (ropt), 
the manufacturing production (mt) and the inflation rate calculated from the GDP deflator 
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( t). The second model (model 2), agricultural production (at), is the same that is used for 
manufacturing production. Appendix 4 shows the co-integration tests for the two models. As 
there is no co-integrating vector among the variables, we conduct a structural VAR model 
rather than a VECM. Following Bjorland (1994), we identified three other structural shocks 
in addition to energy booms ( ). They are real oil price shocks ( ), aggregate demand 
shocks ( ) and aggregate supply shocks ( ).  
Therefore, we define a vector of stationary variables compounded from the first 
difference of the cited macroeconomic variables for each model, such that 
, for model 1 is devoted to the manufacturing sector and 
, for model 2, is devoted to the agricultural sector. Indeed, 
Appendix 2 shows the stationary tests for the level and first difference variables. The 
reduced form of VAR is estimated as   
                    (1) 
where B j (j= 0,1….p) is a matrix of autoregressive coefficients at lag j 
 B0 is the identity matrix 
 et, the residual vector, is serially uncorrelated with the covariance matrix 
Ω. 
 
Following the Wold representation theorem and ignoring the constant term, the 
VAR can be represented as an invertible distributed lag of serially uncorrelated disturbances: 
          (2)  
t
ES t
ROP
t
AD t
AS
zt  ov t,ropt,mt,t
yt  ov t,ropt,at,t
zt  B0  B1zt1 . . .Bpztp  et BLzt  B0  et
zt  CLet
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with    and C0 as the identity matrix.  
The elements in et are contemporaneously correlated and cannot be interpreted as 
structural shocks. To have those structural shocks, they must be orthogonalised by imposing 
restrictions. For this purpose, we must impose enough restrictions to identify the orthogonal 
(structural) components of the error terms. Therefore, a restricted form of the moving 
average containing the vector of original disturbances as linear combinations of the Wold 
innovations can be expressed as  
,             (3) 
where  is the vector of the orthogonal structural disturbances, with , thus  
is normalised to have unit variance for convenience.  
 
(2) and (3) imply that , hence, . Therefore, if D0 is 
defined, then the MA representation in (3) is also derived. It follows from the normalisation 
of  that . This imposes k(k+1)/2 =10 restrictions on the elements in D0 
(k being the number of variables in the VAR). As the D0 matrix comprises sixteen elements, 
we need six more restrictions to orthogonalise the different innovations. These restrictions 
will, at the same time, allow us to introduce into the model the intuitive economic 
explanations for the dynamics of the VAR model. Two types of identifying restrictions are 
considered: short-run and long-run. In our model, we will have one long-run restriction and 
five short-run restrictions.  
As the order of the variable and shocks is important in the structural VAR, we first 
order the four uncorrelated shocks that we previously defined: 
CL  BL1
zt  DLt
t covt  I t
et  D0t CLD0  DL
covt D0D0
  
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. Energy booms will be identified from the equation for oil 
production and are, thus, interpreted as volume changes. To identify these shocks, we 
impose the restrictions that oil production depends only on energy booms and real oil price at 
the first period, in which case, the contemporaneous effects of aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply disturbances on oil production are zero. Rewriting equation (3) in terms of 
the equation of oil production, we have:  
  (5) 
with . 
Oil price shocks in the 1970s are believed to have reduced world manufacturing 
output, but such shocks have also worked to transfer income from the oil importing countries 
to the oil exporting countries. Bjorland (1998) introduces into the VAR model the real oil 
price as opposed to the nominal price, allowing for a focus on both effects. Therefore, we 
will identify real oil price shocks by assuming that changes in real oil price depend only on 
real oil price shocks at the first period. This means that aggregate demand and supply shocks, 
as well as energy booms, will influence the real oil price with a lag, which is reasonable as 
oil price is a financial spot that reacts quickly to news. Rewriting (3), we have: 
  (6) 
with . 
Finally, manufacturing (or agricultural) output will also be impacted by demand and 
supply shocks. To identify these shocks, we include inflation together with manufacturing 
(or agricultural) output. Demand shocks are different from supply shocks in that demand 
shocks are assumed to have no long-run effects on output (cf. Blanchard and Quah, 1989). 
t  tAD  tAS  tES  tOP
ov t  D11LtAD  D12LtAS  D13LtES  D14LtROP
D11,0  D12,0  0
ropt  D21LtAD  D22LtAS  D23LtES  D24LtROP
D21,0  D22,0  D23,0  0
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The long-run effect of the demand shock upon the level of mt (or at) is the sum of the infinite 
number of lag coefficients, . Writing (4) as , where C(1) and 
D(1) indicate the long-run matrices of C(L) and D(L), respectively, the long run-restriction 
implies that D31(1)=0 or : 
  (7) 
Therefore, from (3) the growth rate of manufacturing (or agricultural) output and 
the inflation can be described as:  
   (8)    
    (9) 
 
With these six additional restrictions, our structural VAR is identifiable. However, 
the VAR model results are sensitive to the way in which they are identified, which is why the 
identifying restrictions should have plausible interpretations. Furthermore, the credibility of 
the results could be tested using over-identifying restrictions. Therefore, two 
over-identifying tests will check the respective positive and negative impacts of demand and 
supply shocks on inflation. Indeed, our last restriction concerned the non-existence of a 
long-run effect of demand shocks on output, as opposed to the effect of supply shocks. This 
assumption implies the simultaneous reverse effects of demand and supply on inflation that 
can be verified by examining the impulse response analysis.   
   
     
                                                              

j0

D31,j C1D0  D1
C311D11,0  C321D21,0  C331D31,0  C341D41,0  0
mt  D31LtAD  D32LtAS  D33LtES  D34LtROP
t  D41LtAD  D42LtAS  D43LtES  D44LtROP
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 Data description 
 All variables are quarterly data for the period 1983/Q4 to 2008/Q4. The period 
depends on the data availability. Specific definitions and sources of the data are provided in 
Appendix 1. Before the estimation, we must mention a few data limitations.
11
 First, we 
cannot find quarterly data for the GDP deflator or for the agricultural and manufacturing 
outputs. Therefore, we interpolate yearly data into quarterly data by interpolation cubic 
spline with the last observation matched to the source data
12
. Second, though Chad 
discovered oil reserves in 2003, it still lacks ample data for oil production. Therefore, taking 
these data limitations into consideration, we must be cautious when interpreting the 
estimation results. 
 
The information criteria can be used to determine the optimal lag length. Appendix 
3 suggests that the lag length should be two (model 1) for the combination of manufacturing 
output, oil volume, real oil price and inflation in first differences, and should be three (model 
2) for the combination of the agriculture output and the three other variables also in first 
difference. The data period should be 1985/Q1 to 2008/Q4, after adjustments. 
 
 Empirical results 
 Figures 14 and 15 depict the cumulative effects of demand shocks, supply shocks, 
energy booms and oil price shocks at the level of manufacturing production and the level of 
                                                   
11
 In addition to data limitations, data unreliability is also problem. For example, the IMF (2009) notes that 
“not only are its external sector data unreliable but Chad also has a substantial amount of unrecorded trade with 
Nigeria and Cameroon that would not be reflected in such statistics as the REER and the terms of trade.” 
12 This method assigns each value in the low frequency series to the last high frequency 
observation associated with the low frequency period, then places all intermediate points 
on a natural cubic spline connecting all the points. 
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the GDP deflator, respectively, for model 1. The figures present the response to each shock 
with a one standard deviation band around the point estimates, reflecting the uncertainty of 
the estimated coefficients.  
Demand and supply shocks have a positive impact on manufacturing production, while 
energy booms and real oil price shocks have no significant impacts. Regarding the response 
of the GDP deflator, energy booms have a positive but non-significant impact, while real oil 
price shocks have a positive impact. The responses of GDP deflator to both energy price and 
volume are consistent with Dutch disease, where increases in demand and production in the 
economy push prices upward. A demand shock permanently increases prices, as does a 
supply shock; however, for the supply shock, the inferior band encompasses zero in the long 
run. Therefore, the response to this shock may not be positive, but it may be null or even 
negative. In all cases, the over-identification of restrictions according to which demand 
(supply) shocks increase (reduce) prices is not totally supported by model 1. 
 
Responses of agricultural output and GDP deflator to the four above mentioned shocks are 
depicted in figures 16 and 17. Here, the over-identifying restrictions are supported by model 
2, as shown in figure 17 (we had to consider among the endogenous variables, inflation at 
t+1 instead of t). Additionally, energy booms are found to have a positive impact on prices 
after approximately 8 quarters, while real oil price has a negative impact. Again, this is 
consistent with Dutch disease, even if the results may not be significant given that the 
standard deviation bands encompass the x-axis. Figure 16 indicates that energy booms have 
a negative impact on agricultural production after 4 quarters, which corroborates, again, the 
presence of Dutch disease in the agricultural sector. However, the higher band of the 
30 
 
standard deviation is above the x-axis, implying that output production could continue to 
increase after one year. Real oil price shocks have no significant impact on agriculture 
production. Finally, demand and supply shocks have a permanent significant positive impact 
on agriculture production, as expected.      
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Figure 14: Accumulated response to structural one S.D. innovations ±2 S.E. 
Manufacturing production-model 1 
a) Aggregate demand shock                  b) Aggregate supply shock 
                                     
 
 
c) Energy booms              d) Real oil price shock 
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Figure 15: Accumulated response to structural one S.D. innovations ±2 S.E. 
GDP deflator – model 1 
 
a) Aggregate demand shock                  b) Aggregate supply shock 
 
 
c) Energy booms              d) Real oil price shock 
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Figure 16: Accumulated response to structural one S.D. innovations ±2 S.E. 
Agricultural output – model 2 
 
a) Aggregate demand shock                  b) Aggregate supply shock 
 
 
 
 
c) Energy booms              d) Real oil price shock 
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Figure 17: Accumulated response to structural one S.D. innovations ±2 S.E. 
GDP Deflator – model 2 
 
a) Aggregate demand shock                  b) Aggregate supply shock 
 
 
 
 
c) Energy booms              d) Real oil price shock 
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Tables 1 and 2 present, respectively, the variance decomposition for manufacturing output 
and the GDP deflator of model 1 and the agricultural output and the GDP deflator for model 
2. As oil volume and real oil price are explained by their own variances, we do not present 
their variance decomposition. Furthermore, demand shocks are less important than supply 
shocks in explaining variations in manufacturing output, while the reverse holds for inflation. 
This may reflect a relatively steep short-run supply schedule in terms of a standard aggregate 
demand and supply diagram, where wages and prices adjust quickly, while energy booms 
account for less than 1% of the explained variance in manufacturing. Real oil price shocks, 
on the contrary, explain 2 to 6% of the variance over the first eight years, which is consistent 
with our analysis of the impulse response function. Again, energy booms explain 
approximately 1% of the variation in inflation, while real oil price accounts for 
approximately 10%.   
With respect to model 2, whose results of variance decomposition are displayed in table 2, 
we observe the same pattern for demand and supply shocks, describing the same mechanism 
for price adjustment. Energy booms are responsible for less than 1% during the first year, but 
for approximately 4% thereafter, while 4% of the explained variance in agriculture is 
accounted for by real oil price shocks during the first quarter, though it is less than 2% 
thereafter. With regard to inflation, energy booms explained less than 1% of the variation, 
while real oil price accounts for more than 5% at all horizons. As a robustness check, we 
introduce rainfall as an exogenous variable into the SVAR models. However, the results do 
not change, probably because the effects of this variable are already captured by agricultural 
output.   
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Table 1: Variance decomposition for model 1 
Quarters AD-shock AS-shock ES-shock ROP-shock 
     Manufacturing 
   1 0.00 97.48 0.07 2.45 
4 1.67 97.27 0.08 0.97 
8 19.61 76.23 0.19 3.96 
16 30.45 65.55 0.77 6.23 
32 32.58 60.03 1.04 6.35 
     Inflation 
    1 90.60 3.20 0.32 5.88 
4 87.73 1.06 0.38 10.82 
8 74.23 13.41 1.83 10.53 
16 66.47 22.91 1.62 9.00 
32 63.21 26.49 1.55 8.75 
 
Table 2: Variance decomposition for model 2 
Quarters AD-shock AS-shock ES-shock ROP-shock 
     Agriculture 
    1 0.00 94.86 0.74 4.4 
4 0.42 97.32 0.52 1.73 
8 0.83 93.46 3.87 1.84 
16 2.67 92.01 3.67 1.64 
32 3.50 91.10 3.85 1.55 
     Inflation 
    1 75.88 18.54 0.53 5.04 
4 84.61 8.72 0.16 6.50 
8 78.63 14.96 0.25 6.16 
16 72.03 22.18 0.56 5.23 
32 66.85 27.30 0.94 4.90 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper examines whether Chad, one of the last African countries to have 
discovered oil, could be affected by the natural resource curse. The interest of the study is 
enhanced by the fact that Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world, and this oil 
windfall could be used as a powerful means to alleviate poverty and contribute to economic 
growth. In addition to the stylised facts for analysing channels of the natural resource curse, 
we empirically test for Dutch disease. Our methodology is more refined than the traditional 
methods used to assess Dutch disease, and the results on whether the agricultural sector or 
the manufacturing sector is affected by Dutch disease allow us to better address policy 
recommendations applicable to Chad as well as other similar countries.  
Indeed, there is considerable literature regarding natural resource-rich countries 
that performed very poorly economically. In Africa,  Nigeria failed during four decades of 
oil exploitation to make substantial economic gains, thus poverty remains a problem in 
several Nigerian states, and non-oil economic sectors have stagnated. Our analysis shows 
that Chad’s economy presents several patent features that support the existence of the natural 
resource curse, such as volatility in government resources, poor institutions, recurrent 
tensions, and mismanagement of oil resources. More specifically, there are symptoms of 
Dutch disease. However, as the original model of Corden and Neary (1982) does not take 
into consideration some specificities of developing countries, we attempt to conduct a more 
thorough analysis. The descriptive analysis using Chad’s economic statistics, suggests that 
the agricultural sector could be affected by Dutch disease. However, we could not find clear 
evidence that the manufacturing sector is adversely affected. Furthermore, the features in 
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Chad’s revenue and expenditure systems could be the symptom of Dutch disease, and the 
volatility effect could have negative impacts on investment and economic growth.  
To verify whether there is Dutch disease in Chad’s agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors, we use a structural VAR model and analyse the impulse response functions and 
variance decompositions. Accordingly we find that the manufacturing sector is not 
negatively affected by energy booms, while the agricultural sector could, in the long run, 
react negatively to oil production. The variance decomposition analyses corroborate our 
analyses of an impulse response function. Indeed, the variation of manufacturing output is 
better explained by real oil price shocks than by energy booms. And variation in the 
agricultural sector, while explained in the first year by real oil price shocks, is better 
explained, in the long run, by energy booms.  
 
It should be noted that in the empirical analysis we used interpolated data due to 
data limitations. Therefore, caution should be exercised when interpreting the results of the 
study. Another consideration worthy of mention is that there is a possibility that the decline 
in the agricultural output is due to the decline in the output of the cotton sector (as mentioned 
in the descriptive analysis), rather than to a decline in oil production. In addition, as 
mentioned in Section 2, assuming Chad’s country-specific circumstances, such as the 
existence of large number of unemployed workers and idle capital, there is a possibility that 
Chad could benefit from the oil boom. In fact, the output in the manufacturing sector is 
increasing, as Figure 13 indicates. Given the data limitations and potential concerns, we 
should avoid making hard-line policy prescriptions based solely on the interpretations of our 
findings, as Nkusu (2004) suggests. Further research should be implemented, particularly  
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in the aforementioned fields. 
 Nonetheless, to avoid the Natural Resource Curse phenomenon, we make the 
following policy recommendations.  
 
First, the diversification of exports with respect to both goods and trading partners 
is important. As oil is now its dominant export, Chad’s economy is vulnerable to the demand 
and supply shocks associated with oil. In addition, Chad exports oil mainly to the U.S., and 
the volatility of these oil exports to the U.S.> continue to increase (figure 7), implying that 
Chad’s exports will suffer significantly if the U.S. suffers a severe recession or stops 
importing from Chad for some reason. Figure 7 and Figure 10 imply that oil revenue and 
exports to the U.S. seem to be highly correlated, which could increase the volatility of the 
real effective exchange rate through the spending effect. 
 
Second, wise spending policies are also indispensable. Revenues received from oil 
exports, if well managed, can contribute to economic growth. For example, the government 
should dedicate revenues to the agricultural sector, which used to be the main sector for 
exports. Indeed, Levy (2007) shows that investments in the road network for food 
distribution, irrigation infrastructure and improvements to water access in Chad’s rural areas 
allow for poverty reduction and generate substantial economic growth. 
  
 Our last policy recommendation is to focus on the improvement and transparency 
of Chad’s government and its institutions, as Chad is ranked 175th in the Corruption 
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Perception Index (CPI) in 2009.
13
 As Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) note, 
corruption could be the most influential factor for low economic growth, not Dutch disease. 
The quality of institutions is, therefore, a pre-requisite for the appropriate use of oil windfalls 
to ensure economic growth.   
  
                                                   
13
 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table in detail. Iraq 
and Sudan (176th), Myanmar (178th), Afghanistan (179th), and Somalia (180th) are next to Chad. 
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Appendix 1: Data Description 
Variable Definitions and Sources 
Agricultural output Agriculture, value added (current LCU). By using the CPI 
index (2005=100) as a deflator, we calculate real term basis 
by dividing the agriculture output <AO> by the CPI index, 
namely, AO/(CPI/100)).  
We obtain only annual data and interpolate into quarterly 
basis (cubic interpolation). We use the log form in the 
regression. 
Source: World Development Indicator (WDI). 
Manufacturing output Manufacturing, value added (current LCU). By using CPI 
index (2005=100) as a deflator, we calculate real term basis 
by dividing the manufacturing output <MO> by the CPI 
index, namely, MO/(CPI/100)). 
We obtain only annual data and interpolate into a quarterly 
basis (cubic interpolation). We use the log form in the 
regression. 
Source: World Development Indicator (WDI). 
Oil Price Petroleum, West Texas Intermediate, U.S. dollars per barrel. 
Quarterly basis. We use the log form in the regression. 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Real oil prices are deducted using (n*e)/cpi : with n: nominal 
price;  e : exchange rate on quarterly basis; cpi: consumer 
price index on quarterly basis. Source: International Financial 
Statistics. 
Oil Production Millions of barrels, net volume of shipments from marine 
terminal. Quarterly basis. 
Source: Geointelligence Network, Project update. 
GDP deflator We obtain only annual statistics and, therefore, interpolate 
using the log form to report quarterly data (cubic 
interpolation). 
Source: World Development Indicators 
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Appendix 2: Unit Root Tests 
Variables Level t-value First difference t-value 
   Agricultural output  -1.45   -3.80*** 
Manufacturing output  -1.73  -3.45** 
Real oil price  -1.68   -7.94*** 
Oil volume   -1.59   -4.30*** 
GDP deflator    0.44   -4.36*** 
 
Note: Sample period: 1983/Q4-2008/Q4. Variables are tested by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and 
the number of lags is selected by Schwarz information criterion. The values with *** and ** denote 
significance at one and five percent levels. 
 
 
Appendix 3: Lag Length Criterion 
 
 
  AIC 
 Lag Model 1 Model 2 
0 -6.458048 -5.731075 
1 -9.340037 -9.101054 
2  -12.53185* -11.61106 
3 -12.49483  -11.79172* 
4 -12.32702 -11.70662 
5 -12.14140 -11.69979 
6 -12.15747 -11.48712 
7 -12.01137 -11.47142 
8 -11.90247 -11.68974 
9 -11.86600 -11.70371 
 
 
Note: AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion. * denotes the optimal lag length. 
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Appendix 4: Johansen Cointegration Tests For Level Variables 
 
 
      Model 1 Model 2 
Hypothesised number 
of cointegration 
relations 
Critical Value 5% 
for Max-eigen 
statistic 
Critical Value 
5% for trace 
statistic 
Trace 
statistic 
Max-Eigen 
statistic 
Trace 
statistic 
Max-Eigen 
statistic 
       
None  28.58808  54.07904  52.04482  26.70350 48.46656  22.24319 
At most 1  22.29962  35.19275  25.34132  17.06763 
 
26.22337  17.13465 
At most 2  15.89210  20.26184  8.273689  5.567072 
 
9.088721  5.609753 
At most 3  9.164546  9.164546  2.706617  2.706617 
 
3.478968  3.478968 
 
